Over the course of 150 years the British Imperial civil services in India mastered the art of maintaining a semblance of law and order even under difficult circumstances. It was therefore natural for India to continue with these services after independence. They provided a steel frame which held India together.
Even today, these (by now rickety) tenured civil services continue to offer some value. For instance, about half the new recruits in each state to the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) are from other parts of India; this helps in India’s integration as a nation.
The great problem with tenured services Unfortunately, the few benefits we get from such services are overwhelmed by their many shortcomings. Their main drawback is poor performance since it is not merit but sycophancy (and in India’s case, corruption) that is rewarded; and punishment for bad performance is not an option.
Thus we have a great dichotomy between our public and private sectors today. While Indian business performance is often second to none, the results of India’s public sector are poor beyond description. Delivering simple things like water, electricity, roads, and education is well beyond the capacity even of our elite IAS.
The fault lies with the structure and incentives of our bureaucracy. When seniority is all that matters, incentives for policy expertise and leadership quickly fall apart. In India, this weakness is compounded by relatively low salaries and massive political corruption. The result is simply disastrous. Nothing works, and corruption reigns supreme.
Having worked for 18 years in the IAS and, later, for 8 years in the public services in Australia, I have seen first hand the difference between good and bad bureaucracies. When I started my migrant life in a middle rung of the Victorian bureaucracy in 2001, I was surprised to find that the performance of senior Australian bureaucrats was significantly better than anything I had come across in my Indian peers. Virtually no IAS officer knows more in the relevant subject area, can think as well and as strategically, or lead a team of professionals better than his or her Australian counterpart. Similarly, Australia constantly benchmarks its performance in every sphere with the world’s best, but in India it is enough to be a touch better than Bihar.
The goal of our reforms In my book, Breaking Free of Nehru (available from Oxford bookstores now), I have analysed our current bureaucracy and proposed a process to build a dramatically better one. I believe the change must begin at the top. We need to begin by transforming the incentives of our senior bureaucrats – the secretaries. This can be done by:
abolition of tenure at senior levels;
open market recruitment for each position;
contestability of policy advice to political leaders;
market competitiveness of remuneration;
extensive delegation of responsibility; and
provision of access to the latest technology, information and training.
The validity of these principles becomes clear when we consider how our national cricket team is built. Cricketers are required to demonstrate a continuing strong track record if they want to retain their position in the Indian team. If our selectors were to stop weeding out non-performers, our team’s performance would collapse. A cricket team built on the principles that currently apply to our bureaucracy would have Pataudi as its captain (even today – because of his seniority!) and Sachin would have to wait his turn as the 800th man… and every school level cricket team in Australia would soundly thrash this ‘national’ team!
Obviously, what applies to cricket does not apply fully to a bureaucracy. But recognizing and rewarding merit appropriately is the pivotal issue. While merit is taken into account at the time of entry into the IAS, merit can’t be a one-off measure. A secretary to the government must have a track record of world-best performance as a subject-matter specialist and management guru, and also be a great leader of people. What has writing a good essay in an examination at age 21 got to do with these higher competencies?
The incompetence of the Indian bureaucracy is aggravated because our constitution (effectively) prevents public servants from being punished even when caught taking bribes – let alone demoted for non-performance. With our society thus signaling their invincibility, most officers become indolent, arrogant and supremely ignorant, and yet advance smoothly to senior roles.
Indian taxpayers have continued to fund this useless bureaucracy believing perhaps that there is no alternative. But excellent alternatives are readily available. Advanced countries have used the findings of agency and public choice theory to design systems that reward expertise, leadership and good performance. They also ruthlessly punish bad performance. In doing so, they have transformed their public servants into dynamic agents of change and excellence.
The change process In Breaking Free of Nehru, I have detailed a suitable change process. We need to begin by making a fundamental shift in accountability. Our bureaucracy must become only one of the many potential service providers to our elected representatives. Ministers should begin by hiring world-renowned subject-matter specialists committed to their party’s policy platform as Ministerial advisers. No paper would then go to a Minister without the (political) advisers having had a good look.
A team of Ministers should then (separately) recruit secretaries through an open advertisement. In the first instance, this appointment would be on a two year hire-and-fire performance-based contract ? paying a salary comparable to what senior MNC executives get in India. Secretaries would then similarly recruit their joint secretaries. To ensure continuity, leadership change would need to stop at this point in the first phase. In this phase – during which the future restructure is planned and embedded – no government employee would lose his job.
Each of the newly appointed secretaries would implement a two-year strategic process to restructure the bureaucracy into ten departments: freedom, defence, justice, external affairs, public finance, physical infrastructure, social infrastructure, commerce, social capital and community, and sustainability. This would involve significant re-training and redundancy planning.
A Public Administration Act would underpin the restructured, new bureaucracy. All positions requiring significant judgment and leadership skills would be brought under a three-year performance-based contract. Upon the Act coming into force, all constitutional provisions related to civil services would be repealed.
I am not suggesting that these reforms are a panacea for all governance problems of India. Our political and electoral systems need fundamental reforms, and must preferably come first. Numerous policy changes are also needed. But we can’t change India’s misgovernance without completely changing India’s bureaucracy. The sooner we give our tenured senior executive services like the IAS, IFS, IPS, Forest service, and all ‘central services’ a burial, the better.
Freedom Team of India (FTI) As you might be aware, FTI is now growing steadily. It aims to deliver these (or similar) reforms to India through a mandate to be obtained in due course through elections. Please visit http://freedomteam.in/ and consider joining or supporting this national, liberal effort. I would even venture to suggest that you will do yourself a great favour by supporting these liberal leaders who will create the new India of tomorrow.
(This article was published in the March 2009 issue of Freedom First)
The February issue of Freedom First carried some of the best writings published in this magazine over the past fifty years. But most of these writings perhaps fell on deaf ears, for they advocated freedom at a time when few Indians cared about freedom. Indeed, Indians don’t seem to care much about freedom even today. Law and order has deteriorated, and corruption has become entrenched, but defenders of liberty are nowhere to be seen on the political stage.
Since the Swatantra Party wound up in 1974, virtually no liberal has bothered to contest elections. Yet the basic entry fee for contesting elections in India has remained low – merely a security deposit of Rs. 10,000. There is also no obvious shortage of people with liberal inclinations. And while many young liberals with families may be hard-pressed to contest elections, thousands of retired liberals can surely be mobilized for the defence of liberty.
So why aren’t liberals contesting elections regularly and in sufficient numbers? Are they scared of ‘dirty’ politics and electoral violence? Do they believe elections are too costly? I will show below that these barriers are not as bad as we make them out to be. In any case, the existence of such problems is all the more reason for us to join the fray and fight to change the system.
Myth 1: Indian elections are excessively violent The belief that our elections are excessively violent is somewhat overdone. Of course, there is some electoral violence, but its magnitude is small in comparison to India’s size (we should avoid comparing India with developed countries at this early stage of our development). Of our six lakh villages, only a few hundred will experience violence, with possibly a few hundred people injured and a dozen or two killed. Booth-capturing is also the exception than the norm. Similarly, the Indian Police is particularly good at protecting candidates: virtually no candidate is assaulted or killed of the many thousands who contest. And so, while we should take due precautions, merely contesting elections won’t (generally speaking) kill us.
Myth 2: Money wins elections The second myth relates to money. We know that many parties spend crores of rupees in elections. Accordingly I was recently told: “You require at least 2 crores to fight a parliament election.” True, most corrupt parties do such things but why should we copy these corrupt gangsters? Aren’t we different? We believe in integrity. We do not break the law, even though we disagree with it (I strongly disagree with limits on electoral expenses). We must therefore stick with the Rs. 25 lakhs expense limit prescribed for parliamentary elections. Raising this amount is far easier than raising Rs. 2 crores, particularly for outstanding liberals with good networks.
Then there is the belief that money buys electoral results. It is thought that basti wallahs sell their votes for “Rs.250/- cash, a packet of Biryani and a sachet of country arrack”. But the reality is that voters take money from whosoever gives it to them, but then vote (in the quiet secrecy the polling booth) for the candidate they actually believe in. I know of a politician who disbursed Rs.35 lakhs in slum areas in Mumbai in a single night but lost the election! In any event, bribing every voter can be astonishingly expensive, costing over Rs. 30 crores per constituency! No one spends that much in any election.
At the broader level, I question why even Rs. 25 lakhs is really necessary. Some reflection will show that electoral results depend primarily on the following four things. a) The message. While the average voter is not interested in the details of policy, he wants to know what the proposed policies will mean for him. A well-tailored campaign can make a great difference, and that does not mean throwing money around. b) Time spent talking to the electorate. Good candidates spend a lot of time in their constituencies to build networks of supporters. c) Quality and commitment of the candidate. Good candidates speak coherently and demonstrate commitment to their constituents’ interests. d) Credibility of the bid. The Indian voter is highly strategic and doesn’t waste his vote on independent candidates or on ill-prepared ‘one-man political parties’. He wants to know that the candidate he will vote for has a genuine chance of becoming a part of government.
While money can facilitate these things, it is not the key driver of success. If liberals do their homework and work as a team, then even Rs. 25 lakhs won’t be needed to win. Ask the Janata Party which trounced the corrupt Congress of 1977. Or ask the Telugu Desam of 1982, or Asom Gana Parishad of 1985. Many of these parties were formed weeks before elections and barely spent any money, but won huge majorities.
Time to stop making excuses! If contesting elections is not that dangerous nor that expensive, then why do we find so many excuses? Highly successful organisational leaders tell us with a serious face that they “don’t have the leadership capability to lead India”. If even these excellent people think they can’t lead us politically, then who can? The local gangster?
Nandan M Nilekani of Infosys wrote in Imagining India that he is “quite unelectable” – thus conveniently washing his hands off politics. Apart from the fact that it is highly presumptuous for anyone to assume the response of the voter, all that the voter really wants is a demonstration of good citizenship, not some mythical glorious leadership. I therefore ask Mr Nilekani and others like him to stop making excuses and join politics as good citizens. Give our voters a chance to elect good people.
Maybe (I hope I’m wrong on this one!) some liberals have big egos which will receive a rude jolt if they lose elections. If the idea of losing elections prevents people from contesting elections, let me assure them that fighting elections honourably will be seen by every right thinking person as a sign of good citizenship. Indeed, the benchmark in politics is so low that any good person who enters politics will be highly regarded. Beyond that, the true liberal must never be bothered about victory or defeat. We are obliged to do the right thing irrespective of results. The fight for freedom is too important for us to make our fight contingent on future success. Let us first get out there and fight for our freedoms. Let the fight succeed whenever it will; that is not for us to worry about.
A good liberal platform needed The real gap today is not of funds or potential leaders, but of a platform where good people can assemble and offer a viable alternative to the voter. That is what the Freedom Team of India (FTI) aims to become. FTI has now developed a professionally designed website (freedomteam.in) and well-written brochure. Please take a look at these for yourself and ponder your future plans. Do you want to continue making excuses for the rest of your life or are ready to work as a team to start defending your liberties?
In brief,as I mention in detail in Breaking Free of Nehru, (BFN) the concept of NegativeIncomeTax derives from idea of a level playing field (reasonable equality of opportunity). It is radically different from socialist concepts (including welfare socialist concepts) of equality of outcomes. It is unrelated to economic equality at any level.
BFN explains this at length, – some material is in the 'Online Notes'. My second book, The Discovery of Freedom clarifies why this is compatible with reasonable equality of opportunity (equal freedom) and different from Rawlsian welfare socialism. The level of NIT is only the 'top-up' needed to achieve a FRUGAL level of existence, sufficient to allow a fully functioning body and mind. Much more important in terms of equalising opportunity for all is high quality school education for all children and emergency health care for all.
More later as I find time. This should do for now.
By Sanjeev Sabhlok, published in Freedom First, Mumbai, January 2009.
For a wealth-destroying event of the magnitude of the global financial crisis (GFC) to have taken place despite celebrated economists running Western economies tells us that ‘standard’ economics has failed at a most fundamental level, like theories which said the earth is flat. Instead, the ideas of thinkers like Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek (the economics Nobel prize winner of 1974) of the Austrian school of economics, who repeatedly warned about the dangers of state-induced distortions in money markets, have been fully vindicated.
Unfortunately, the economics taught today continues to ignore these great economists’ insights. Current economics is more inclined to side with Marx who dreamt of state-controlled credit in the hands of a national bank. It is time the world asks these ‘standard’ economists the blunt question: why must free societies have Marxian central banking?
Unfree financial markets People exchange goods and services in the free market at a mutually agreed price. The unit and medium of exchange, money, is also created by these markets. For instance, notes issued by private banks in medieval Europe, being commitments to pay specified amounts of gold to the bearer of these notes, were readily accepted as money. This system of money creation and banking, based on the ‘gold standard’, arose spontaneously from freedom.
However, in 1694, the British government, in financial distress, found a convenient way to produce money from thin air by giving sole rights to produce money to the newly established (private) Bank of England, and receiving an advance of £1.2 million in return. This anti-competitive distortion of previously free money markets became very popular among later governments. Some enlightened governments did allow free banking for a while: for instance, in Sweden between 1830 and 1902. Indeed, this (Swedish) free banking episode eliminated booms and busts and dramatically reduced bank failures. But Sweden soon abandoned free banking because it demands great discipline from governments which would rather follow Robert Mugabe’s inflationary footsteps, instead.
The free market also ordinarily determines the price of money, which is the interest rate that this money commands in a competitive marketplace. This market-based interest rate perfectly matches the society’s time preference of consumption. But central banks are established exclusively to interfere with this free determination of interest rates by distorting money supply and fixing the price of money. Naturally consumers and entrepreneurs are confused in these economies.
We can see why Americans save so little and borrow so much. By deliberately preventing the time preference of society from being disclosed through the market, and by (often) forcing interest rates to fall below their market rate, people are motivated to consume more and save less. Sensible persons won’t save when their savings don’t earn much interest or even earn a negative interest after inflation and taxes. They would rather borrow at low interest rates and consume in excess. Americans are quite rational; it is their politicians and central bankers whose heads need a check up.
Betrayal of freedom Like other socialist planners, central banks are prone to imagine that the solutions to the world’s problems lie inside their presumably super-intelligent but in reality deeply flawed and ill-informed brains (we are all similarly endowed: that is the basic truth about human frailty). Fatal conceit afflicts them as they try to ‘fine tune’ the economy by randomly tinkering with money supply and its price. Alan Greenspan (whom the great philosopher of freedom, Ayn Rand, erroneously considered as her disciple) wrote in the 1960s that the US Federal Reserve (Fed) had ‘nearly destroyed the economies of the world’ in the 1920s, and that ‘a free banking system stands as the protector of an economy’s stability and balanced growth’. This was, no doubt, good thinking.
But strange things happened between 1987 and 2006. As Chairman of the Fed, Greenspan changed colours. Not only did he not liberate the money markets, he kept interest rates artificially low, particularly between January 2001 and June 2004. Had he recalled the Austrian trade cycle theory (which Ayn Rand endorsed) he would have realized the great dangers of administering the price of money. His artificially low interest rates persuaded entrepreneurs worldwide to build things like houses and car factories in great excess, leading to the same over-investment that led to the roaring 20’s and thence to the Great Depression. Greenspan thus did exactly what he had earlier decried. Freedom was betrayed by the man once considered its great votary. It is now time to stop this stupidity of having a controlled product (money) in otherwise frees societies. Central banking, the illegitimate child of mercantilist monarchs and communist utopians, must be abolished. We must get free banking, instead: based on the gold standard.
US government’s socialist interventions These massive failures of the Fed were greatly exacerbated by American welfare socialism. Nationalised Fannie Mae was created in 1938 to funnel federal funds into home loans, artificially boosting the demand for housing. It was (notionally) privatised in 1968 but remained guaranteed by the US government. Freddie Mac was later created in 1970 to allegedly provide Fannie Mae with competition. American welfare socialism worsened with Jimmy Carter’s 1977 Community Reinvestment Act which required all banks to give loans to people without income or on low income, over-riding good lending practices. Fannie May and Freddie Mac (FMFM) were thereafter ‘leaned upon’ by successive US governments to buy the sub-prime mortgages issued by banks. Then started what can only be (in polite terms) termed as government-supported fraud. FMFM started guaranteeing sub-prime loans issued by Bear Stearns and also directly sold such debt to foreigners.
Catching and punishing those who make false or misleading claims about a product is a primary function of the government, but the US Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (charged with supervising FMFM) did nothing to block these falsehoods. Activities of a similar nature were also unfolding in the private marketplace in relation to financially engineered products. For instance, Credit Suisse Group Sellers misled markets about the risks of its securities by touting the AAA ratings it got (bought?) from Standard & Poor’s. Self-regulation dramatically failed in the financial sector.
In addition, urban planning laws in many parts of the USA prevented urban boundaries from expanding even though thousands of new housing loans had been issued. This caused house prices to skyrocket. All these bad policies, together with low interest rates, fuelled a major housing bubble which has now burst. The main lesson we can draw from the GFC is that economic booms and busts are always created by government interference, mismanagement, and incompetence; not when markets are free and held to account.
I fear that worse things may be in store for the USA, including the possible collapse of the US dollar by about 2018 given its massive unfunded social security and medicare obligations (the only way to save USA would be for other countries to follow even worse policies!). After destroying and socialising its financial system, the USA government has now started throwing its taxpayers’ money at failing companies. In a free society each business or company must take responsibility for its own decisions; if it becomes insolvent it must declare bankruptcy as part of its accountability. If any value is still left over, private investors will buy it out. Using taxpayer funds to bail out companies that no one wants to touch, amounts to theft of taxpayers’ hard-earned money. Also, by rewarding incompetents, it creates disincentives for prudential management.
Lessons for India Despite being founded under the banner of liberty, America has never been completely free. But its badly regulated money and financial markets, coupled with its socialist response to the GFC, shows that it is no longer fit to talk about freedom. This makes it even more important for India to show the way.
India’s Reserve Bank should get out of the business of creating money and fixing the price of money. It should become an independent regulator of a private money and banking system. Its current functions should be unbundled: coins and notes should be issued only by private banks; the lender of last resort function should be performed by private insurance companies. Reforms on these lines will disclose the market’s true interest rate, and price risks transparently, thus enabling uninterrupted economic growth. Good fiscal policy would have to accompany such reforms, including policies to minimise inflation, but I’ll touch upon these related policies in a separate article.
The Freedom Team of India India needs leaders urgently to take it to freedom. I’d like to request you to consider joining the Freedom Team (freedomteam.in) to lead India. The task is clearly becoming more urgent than ever before.
MANY claim that the global financial crisis has slain the most important economic theory of the last half-century — the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) — and, therefore, that much more government intervention in financial markets is necessary.
In fact, the GFC didn’t even give the EMH a flesh wound. At least in Australia, there should be less intervention — not more.
Kevin Rudd blames the EMH for engendering the “belief in the superiority of unregulated financial markets” that he holds responsible for the GFC. Even my excellent MBS colleague Ian Harper — member of the 1997 Wallis Inquiry into Australia’s financial system — says the GFC had “blown efficient markets theory out the water”. Other doubters include ASIC chairman Tony D’Aloisio and Warren Buffett, justifiably the world’s most admired investor.
EMH critics either don’t understand what it is or (in Harper’s case) refer to one particular corollary, on which doubts are most defensible. In 1965, Eugene Fama — who fathered the EMH — defined an “efficient market” as one in which individual security prices “fully reflect all available information”.
Critics often cite economist Robert Shiller, author of the best-seller Irrational Exuberance, which was published just before the dotcom crash. Shiller agrees with the famous “Samuelson dictum” — that financial markets are micro-efficient, but may not be macro-efficient. That is, markets price individual securities well, but overall market levels may not reflect reality. Nobel Prize winner Paul Samuelson propounded his dictum in the midst of the dotcom boom and soon after the Asian financial crisis.
The entire rationale for light regulation rests on financial market’s micro-efficiency, not macro-efficiency.
In 2005, Shiller concluded: “Substantial evidence vividly illustrates the truth in Samuelson’s dictum for the US stockmarket since 1926.” His key reason is that substantially more information is available on the drivers of individual firms’ cashflows (hence their intrinsic values) than on the overall market’s drivers (such as future macro-economic growth).
Even the world’s best-known EMH advocates recognise that macro-inefficiency may exist. Six months before the 2007 market peak, Burton Malkiel (author of A Random Walk Down Wall Street) questioned in The Wall Street Journal whether the market was exhibiting “irrational complacency”, given that macro-economic indicators were already slowing.
Critics also mock assumptions that they claim the EMH makes. Even the otherwise sensible Lindsay Tanner wrote: “The efficient markets theory and the assumption that people act rationally are under intellectual siege.” But Fama explained in 1965 that this and other assumptions — if true — were sufficient for the EMH to hold, but not necessary. Those assumptions probably don’t hold in the banana market either, but it works pretty well.
If critics cite any micro-inefficiency examples, they’re the usual suspects: the Dutch tulip and South Sea “bubbles”. The tulip case actually reflected a government-supported change in trading rules and a ban on short-selling. As tulip bulbs cannot be uprooted between October and May, the large price rises between November 1636 and February 1637 were on futures contracts, which obligated buyers to pay the contracted price for next season’s bulbs. But from November 1636, the Florists Guild had been moving to give buyers the right to avert this obligation by paying a small fee — and for this change to apply retrospectively to all contracts made from that time.
That is, the market knew that “futures” contracts may become “options” contracts from November. The likelihood of this happening kept rising until it was mandated in February 1637. As that likelihood rose, buyers willingly agreed to higher prices because they were less likely to have to pay them. The “crash” in February 1637 simply reflected the fact that, in any market, options trade at a small fraction of futures prices. “Tulipmania” claimants are comparing the prices of apples and bananas. Indeed, UCLA’s Earl Thompson concluded that “Tulipmania” was actually a “remarkable illustration of market efficiency”.
The South Sea fiasco didn’t reflect market inefficiency. Market prices can only reflect available information. Instead, it highlights the dangers in governments granting monopolies to private companies. After the crash, fraud by South Sea directors and corruption in the British Cabinet was exposed. The chancellor of the exchequer was jailed.
While macro-inefficiency may be possible, stockmarket crashes do not “prove” it. We often und erestimate the impact that new information can have on estimated intrinsic values. The intrinsic value of a share paying $1 a year dividend with expected annual growth of 5 per cent and a 10 per cent cost of equity is $21. Suppose a “shock” (subprime crisis, say) raises investors’ risk premium by 1 per cent and makes them expect a 30 per cent dividend cut to 70c a share for the next three years, before 5 per cent annual dividend growth is restored. Rational investors would cut their estimated intrinsic value fall by 49 per cent — about how much our market dropped by.
While most EMH tests are of micro-efficiency, there is even some evidence supporting macro-efficiency. A 2008 study by Australian researchers Jae Kim and Abul Shamsuddin of sharemarket indices (like the Nikkei) before and after the Asian financial crisis found they were efficient in relatively developed markets, such as Hong Kong and Japan. Market efficiency was strongest in nations with business cultures and regulatory arrangements conducive to transparent corporate governance (such as good disclosure rules).
In questioning the EMH, D’Aloisio cited the collapse of various unlisted managed investment schemes and debenture issues. But no EMH advocate has ever claimed it applies to these over-the-counter products, for good reason. Investor prices (on both buy entry and exit) are set by issuers, not by a free, competitive, transparent market. In the latter, sophisticated investors and arbitrageurs work to keep security prices sensible; they cannot do so with the products D’Aloisio cites.
And D’Aloisio was wrong in claiming that the Wallis Inquiry said “there shouldn’t be capital requirements” on issuers of these products due to “the efficiency of the market”. The Wallis committee didn’t recommend capital requirements because they were unnecessary to protect financial system stability — those products, in total, represent too tiny a share of total financial assets to pose any significant systematic risk. Wallis instead emphasised the need for good disclosure requirements, which ASIC is now moving to strengthen.
The very best protection for retail investors is free, competitive, transparent securities markets, because prices are then most likely to reflect intrinsic values. Governments should certainly ensure transparency by mandating good disclosure and punishing rumour-mongering and insider trading. But interventions like short-selling bans actually inhibit market efficiency — putting retail investors at more risk, not less.
It is also important to distinguish between macro-inefficiency in financial markets versus the real economy. Samuelson once said that the real economy’s business cycle “like herpes, has always been with us”. A Keynesian, he supports activist macro-economic policies to keep that disease in check — but not activism in financial markets. The Federal Reserve’s 1929 intervention to prick what it saw as a stockmarket bubble — and the Great Depression that followed — demonstrates the danger.
My big worry is that our Prime Minister will overreact. Rudd had advocated “constraining excessive expansion of derivatives markets” and a “fundamental regime change” to “social capitalism” — “a system of open markets, unambiguously regulated by an activist state”. Activism can be taken far too far.
Politicians may think markets overreact, but never look in the mirror. At least markets soon correct themselves. Politicians rarely do.
Paul Kerin is Professorial Fellow, Melbourne Business School
=== Here’s an excellent article: “Milton Friedman and the Case against Currency Monopoly” by Selgin, George; Cato Journal, Spring-Summer 2008, v. 28, iss. 2, pp. 287-301 (EconLit with Full Text)
http://bit.ly/c3bKdk – Crisis puts nails back in Keynesian coffin, by Michael Stutchbury, Economics editor From: The Australian June 15, 2010
The widespread demand after the financial crisis for radical modifications to capitalism typically paid little attention to whether in fact proposed government substitutes would do better, rather than worse, than markets.
Government regulations and laws are obviously essential to any well-functioning economy. Still, when the performance of markets is compared systematically to government alternatives, markets usually come out looking pretty darn good.
(The turning point was the spring and summer of 2004. Fannie and Freddie had kept their exposures low to loans made with little or no documentation (no-doc and low-doc loans), owing to their internal risk-management guidelines that limited such lending. In early 2004, however, senior management realized that the only way to meet the political mandates was to massively cut underwriting standards.)
I would fully endorse the Justice Department criminally pursuing the people who did the bad deeds. But, they instead have chosen to treat the banks as piñatas and a ready source of cash to fund U.S. government operations.
These large fines don’t do anything to the people who did the deeds – they just reinforce the belief that it’s a cost of doing business.
Instead, they wreak tremendous damage on stockholders, which are primarily American citizens, their pension funds and insurers.
Let’s not forget that most of the ‘bad deeds’ began by the exhortations of: 1) Barney Frank (a famous US Congressman who was the Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee), who pushed U.S. banks to loan money to poor people who couldn’t qualify for mortgages as part of his belief in social justice … and who famously said “I want to roll the dice a little bit more in this situation toward subsidized housing.” 2) the Federal Reserve, which pressured the banks to buy the companies that often did the bad deeds in order to save the U.S. financial system and, by extent, the world economy as the economic crisis deepened. (The most famous example is Bank Of America’s purchase of Countrywide, which actually made the bad loans BAC is being punished for.)
There is plenty of blame to go around … but, much of it is directly attributable to the U.S. Government Congress, both political parties, and our vaunted regulatory agencies which aggressively enforced the political clamor to make mortgage loans to poor people so they could own homes, regardless of their ability to repay).
Hypocrisy is an elemental part of the political process and we see it every day in our government. I just want it to finally be moderated here so that us stockholders can regain our savings and fund our retirements … and so that our banks are again willing to make the loans necessary to grow our economy.
Right now, the U.S. government is actively sabotaging all three of these necessary requirements through their extended bleeding of Bank America, Citigroup, JP Morgan, and other banks.
This bubble was purely created by loose monetary policy. That doesn’t mean everyone has to start defaulting in their payments immediately. It would be a mistake to default if your house price is increasing in value.
However, in the US, most mortgagees can walk out of their mortgage once the property goes below its purchase price. So AFTER the bubble burst (due to many factors – all bubbles burst sooner or later), the default rate THEN shot up. The buyers who had bought high, walked out, setting off a chain reaction, making it attractive even for those who could pay, to default.
The problem with Erdmann’s spurious argument is his assumption (2):
“2) As rates rose, low income households with unsustainable ARM mortgages couldn’t afford their mortgage payments. Delinquencies started to pile up.”
No one in his right mind said that. See my January 2009 article in which I refer to the HOUSING BUBBLE (not delinquencies) and a range of socialist policies as the driver of the GFC.